2.6 - Stalemate & War of Attrition (1938-1941)
Key facts and dates
The Second Sino-Japanese War, beginning in 1937, quickly descended into a prolonged stalemate by 1938, as Japan failed to secure a decisive victory over China despite early territorial gains. This period of attrition drained resources on both sides, with significant developments shaping the war's trajectory.
Timeline of key events
- 1937 – Japan captures major Chinese cities like Beijing and Nanjing after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident.
- 1938 – GMD government relocates to Chongqing, adopting a strategy of trading space for time; Burma Road opens as a critical supply line for China.
- 1939 – Communist guerrilla bases in northern China intensify attacks on Japanese forces.
- 1940 – Japan establishes the Reorganised National Government under Wang Jingwei as a puppet state.
- 1940-1941 – Implementation of the brutal Three Alls Policy to suppress resistance.
- 1941 – U.S. Lend-Lease program increases aid to China; Soviet aid continues.
Reasons for the stalemate in the Second Sino-Japanese War
By 1938, despite Japan's early successes in capturing major Chinese cities and key railway lines, the war had settled into a grinding stalemate. Several interconnected factors prevented Japan from forcing a Chinese surrender, turning the conflict into a war of attrition.
Key factors contributing to the stalemate
- Geographical challenges - China's vast territory made complete occupation nearly impossible. Japan controlled urban centres and rail lines in so-called 'pacified zones', but the rural countryside remained a hotbed of resistance.
- Chinese resilience - Both the Nationalist Guomindang (GMD) and Communist forces refused to capitulate, employing different strategies to prolong the war and exhaust Japanese resources.
- Overextension of Japanese forces - With over one million soldiers committed to China, Japan struggled to maintain control over occupied areas while facing constant harassment from guerrilla fighters.
- Lack of decisive victory - Japan's inability to destroy Chinese military capacity or political will meant the war dragged on, draining morale and resources without a clear end in sight.
The GMD government's strategy: trading space for time
Facing overwhelming Japanese military power, the GMD government under Chiang Kai-shek adopted a defensive strategy to preserve its forces and wait for external support. This approach significantly contributed to the prolonged stalemate.
Relocation and strategic retreat
- Move to Chongqing (1938) - After losing key eastern cities, the GMD relocated its capital to Chongqing in western China, a mountainous and remote location difficult for Japanese forces to attack directly.
- Trading space for time - Instead of engaging in direct confrontations, the GMD ceded territory to Japan, preserving their military strength while hoping for international intervention, particularly from Western powers or the Soviet Union.
- Prolonging resistance - This strategy frustrated Japanese efforts to deliver a knockout blow, as the GMD government remained operational and continued to coordinate national resistance from its new base.
Communist guerrilla warfare and its impact
While the GMD focused on strategic retreat, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) employed guerrilla tactics from their northern base areas. These efforts played a critical role in sustaining Chinese resistance and weakening Japanese control.
Tactics and effects of guerrilla warfare
- Base areas in the north - The CCP established strongholds in regions like Yan'an, from which they launched attacks on Japanese-held territories.
- Guerrilla tactics - Small, mobile units conducted ambushes, sabotaged supply lines, and disrupted communications, avoiding large-scale battles to minimise losses.
- Strain on Japanese resources - Constant rural attacks forced Japan to divert troops from urban centres to the countryside, stretching their military thin and undermining control over 'pacified' zones.
- Boost to morale - Successful guerrilla operations inspired local populations to resist, creating a network of support that further frustrated Japanese occupation efforts.
Japan's puppet governments and limited effectiveness
To consolidate control and reduce direct military involvement, Japan established puppet regimes in occupied territories. However, these governments struggled to gain legitimacy or achieve strategic goals.
The Reorganised National Government of China
The Reorganised National Government was established under Wang Jingwei in 1940. Japan set up this puppet state in Nanjing, led by Wang Jingwei, a former GMD politician who defected, aiming to portray it as a legitimate Chinese authority.
Limited effectiveness of the puppet government:
- The regime lacked popular support, as many Chinese viewed it as a tool of Japanese imperialism.
- It failed to weaken resistance or reduce the burden on Japanese troops.
- Rather than dividing Chinese opposition, puppet governments often galvanised resistance by highlighting Japan's exploitative intentions, further alienating local populations.
Economic and military strain on Japan
The prolonged war in China placed immense pressure on Japan's economy and military capabilities. This resource drain became a significant factor in the stalemate, as Japan struggled to sustain its war effort.
Impacts of the war of attrition
- Massive troop commitment - Over one million Japanese soldiers were stationed in China, diverting manpower from other potential theatres of war and straining recruitment and training systems.
- Economic burden - The cost of maintaining such a large force, coupled with disrupted trade and resource extraction due to resistance, weakened Japan's industrial and financial capacity.
- Resource depletion - Essential materials like oil and metals became scarce as the war consumed supplies faster than they could be replenished, hampering long-term military planning.
- Morale and strategic issues - The inability to secure victory eroded confidence among Japanese leaders and soldiers, creating internal pressures as the war dragged on without resolution.
Brutal pacification campaigns: the Three Alls Policy
In response to persistent guerrilla resistance, Japan implemented harsh measures to crush opposition in rural areas. These brutal policies often backfired, intensifying Chinese resistance rather than quelling it.
Nature and consequences of pacification efforts
- The Three Alls Policy (1940-1941) - This ruthless strategy, meaning "kill all, burn all, loot all," aimed to eliminate resistance by destroying villages, massacring civilians, and seizing resources in guerrilla-active areas.
- Increased hostility - Such brutality alienated local populations, driving more people to join or support resistance movements as a form of retaliation or survival.
- Cycle of violence - While intended to secure control, these campaigns deepened the stalemate by creating a hostile environment where Japanese forces faced constant danger, further draining their resources and resolve.
International support routes sustaining Chinese resistance
Despite internal challenges, China managed to sustain its war effort through vital supply lines supported by foreign powers. These routes were crucial in preventing total collapse under Japanese pressure.
Key lifelines for Chinese forces
- The Burma Road - This critical supply route, connecting Burma (modern-day Myanmar) to southwest China, opened in 1938 and facilitated the transport of weapons, ammunition, and other essentials from Allied nations throughout the war.
- Soviet aid routes - The Soviet Union provided military equipment, aircraft, and advisors through overland routes in northwest China, bolstering Chinese capabilities during the early years of the war.
- Impact on resistance - These supply lines ensured that both GMD and Communist forces remained equipped to fight, countering Japan's attempts to isolate and starve out resistance. This external support was a key factor in maintaining the stalemate, as China could continue the war of attrition without immediate capitulation.