Key facts and dates

Britain's relationship with Europe during the 1960s was marked by repeated attempts to join the European Economic Community (EEC), reflecting a shift in economic and political priorities. The following timeline captures the critical moments surrounding Labour's approach under Harold Wilson and the challenges faced due to French opposition.

Timeline of key events

• 1963 – Conservative government's first EEC application fails due to French President Charles de Gaulle's veto.
• 1964 – Harold Wilson becomes Prime Minister, initially focusing on alternatives to the EEC.
• 1967 (May) – Labour government under Wilson submits a second application for EEC membership.
• 1967 (November) – De Gaulle vetoes Britain's application again, citing economic and political concerns.
• 1964-1970 – Ongoing divisions within Labour over European integration intensify.

Labour's motivations for a second EEC application in 1967

During the 1960s, Britain faced significant economic and geopolitical challenges that influenced its approach to Europe. Following the Conservative government's failed attempt to join the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1963, the Labour government under Harold Wilson reassessed its position. The EEC, established in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome, was a customs union and economic partnership of six European nations aimed at fostering economic integration and preventing future conflicts.

Driving factors for renewed application

• Economic necessity - Britain's economy was struggling with slow growth and balance of payments issues, making access to the EEC's common market attractive for boosting trade and investment.
• Failure of alternatives - The European Free Trade Association (EFTA), a looser trade bloc formed in 1960 as an alternative to the EEC, had not delivered the expected economic benefits, leaving Britain isolated from the more dynamic European market.
• Global repositioning - With the decline of the British Empire and diminishing influence in global affairs, closer ties with Europe were seen as a way to maintain international relevance, especially as the United States encouraged European integration.

Harold Wilson's pragmatic shift towards the EEC

Harold Wilson, Labour Prime Minister from 1964 to 1970, initially approached European integration with caution, reflecting both personal scepticism and party divisions. However, by 1967, his stance evolved into a pragmatic acceptance of the need to join the EEC, driven by economic realities rather than ideological enthusiasm.

Reasons for Wilson's change in approach

• Recognition of EFTA's shortcomings - Wilson acknowledged that EFTA, which Britain had co-founded as a counterweight to the EEC, could not compete with the economic dynamism of the EEC's integrated market.
• Economic survival - Facing persistent economic difficulties, including sterling crises, Wilson saw EEC membership as a potential solution to stabilise and modernise the British economy through access to a larger market.
• Strategic compromise - While not a passionate Europhile, Wilson viewed membership as a necessary step to secure Britain's future, balancing domestic political pressures with international demands.

The application process and de Gaulle's veto in November 1967

In May 1967, the Labour government formally submitted its second application to join the EEC, hoping for a different outcome than the 1963 rejection. However, the process encountered familiar resistance from French President Charles de Gaulle, whose vision for Europe prioritised French leadership and excluded Britain for strategic reasons.

The application process

• Application submission - Britain sought to demonstrate commitment to European integration, emphasising economic alignment and willingness to accept EEC rules, despite lingering reservations about sovereignty.

De Gaulle's objections and veto

• Economic concerns - De Gaulle cited Britain's economic weaknesses, particularly the instability of the pound sterling, which faced repeated devaluation pressures and was seen as a liability to the EEC's financial stability.
• American ties as a barrier - De Gaulle also pointed to Britain's close political and military relationship with the United States, including its role in NATO, as incompatible with his vision of a Europe independent of American influence.
• Second veto in November 1967 - For the second time, de Gaulle blocked Britain's entry, arguing that Britain was not sufficiently 'European' in outlook and would disrupt the cohesion of the Community.

Divisions within the Labour Party over European integration

The question of EEC membership exposed deep divisions within the Labour Party, reflecting broader ideological and practical concerns. These internal conflicts complicated Wilson's efforts to present a unified front during the application process.

Pro-European faction

• Some Labour members, particularly moderates, supported membership for economic reasons, believing it would modernise Britain and strengthen ties with prosperous European neighbours.

Opposition to membership

• Left-wing opposition - Many on Labour's left opposed joining the EEC, viewing it as a capitalist project that threatened socialist principles, such as state control of industry, and undermined British sovereignty by transferring power to unelected European institutions.
• Sovereignty concerns - Critics across the party worried about the loss of national decision-making, fearing that EEC rules would constrain Britain's ability to pursue independent economic and foreign policies.

Wilson navigated these divisions by framing membership as a pragmatic economic choice rather than a political or ideological commitment, though this did little to resolve internal tensions.

The role of George Brown as a pro-European Foreign Secretary

George Brown, Labour's Foreign Secretary from 1966 to 1968, emerged as a key advocate for EEC membership within the government. His enthusiasm contrasted with Wilson's more reserved approach, providing a strong voice for integration during a critical period.

Brown's contributions to the European cause

• Passionate advocacy - Brown actively promoted the benefits of joining the EEC, arguing that it offered economic opportunities and a chance to play a leading role in shaping Europe's future.
• Diplomatic efforts - As Foreign Secretary, he worked to build support among EEC member states, seeking to counter French resistance through direct engagement and highlighting Britain's commitment to European values.
• Influence on policy - Brown's pro-European stance helped push the application forward despite internal party scepticism, providing a counterbalance to anti-EEC voices within Labour and reinforcing the government's case for membership.

The broader impact of rejection on British politics and national psyche

De Gaulle's second veto in November 1967 had profound effects on Britain, influencing both political strategies and public perceptions of the country's role in the world. Repeated rejection deepened Britain's sense of international isolation and intensified debates over its future direction.

Consequences of the veto

• Political frustration - The veto reinforced perceptions of Britain as an outsider in Europe, prompting frustration among politicians who saw membership as essential for economic recovery and global influence.
• National psyche and identity - Repeated rejections damaged national confidence, contributing to a sense of decline as Britain struggled to redefine its post-imperial identity and grappled with being excluded from a thriving European bloc.
• Centrality of the European dilemma - The issue of Europe became a defining question in British politics, highlighting tensions between maintaining sovereignty and embracing integration, a debate that would persist for decades.
• Future implications - The veto delayed Britain's entry into the EEC until 1973, after de Gaulle's departure from power, but it also spurred determination among pro-Europeans to persist, shaping long-term political alignments and strategies.